The following case emphasizes the importance of voluntarily disclosing any export violations or suspected violation immediately. Disclosure of a violation is a mitigating factor in  and greatly reduces the chance of your company being assessed fines or sanctions.

Justice: “Justice Department Declines Prosecution of Company That Self-Disclosed Export Control Offenses Committed by Employee”

(Source: DOJ Office of Public Affairs, 1 May 2025) [Excerpts]

Company’s Prompt Self-Disclosure and Extraordinary Cooperation Led to Employee’s Successful Prosecution for Unlawfully Exporting Software to a Restricted Chinese University

The Justice Department today announced that it has declined the prosecution of Universities Space Research Association (USRA) after it self-disclosed to the Department’s National Security Division (NSD) criminal violations of U.S. export control laws committed by its former employee, Jonathan Soong.

Soong pleaded guilty to willfully violating the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by exporting U.S. Army-developed aviation software to a university in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that had been placed on the Commerce Department’s Entity List and was sentenced to 20 months in prison. . . .

According to court documents, in April 2016, USRA contracted with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to, among other things, license and distribute for a fee aeronautics-related and U.S. Army-owned flight control software.

Soong was employed by USRA as a program administrator under the contract and was responsible for performing due diligence on prospective purchasers to ensure that the sale or transfer of software licenses complied with applicable law, including by checking the Entity List.

Soong willfully exported software subject to the EAR to Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, also known as Beihang University (Beihang), a university in the PRC, knowing that an export control license was required for the export to Beihang because it was on the Entity List.  . . .

Within days of learning that Soong had willfully violated U.S. export control laws, and before USRA had completed its own investigation to understand the scope of the misconduct, USRA self-disclosed the crime to NSD and fully cooperated with the ensuing criminal investigation, which eventually established that Soong had acted alone at USRA.

USRA’s cooperation included proactively identifying, collecting, and disclosing relevant evidence to investigators, including foreign language evidence and evidence located overseas, and providing detailed and timely responses to the government’s requests for information and evidence.

USRA remediated the root cause of the misconduct by disciplining a supervisory employee who failed appropriately to supervise Soong, and by significantly improving its internal controls and compliance program. USRA also compensated the government both for the funds Soong embezzled, and for the time Soong had spent embezzling funds instead of performing his duties under USRA’s contract with NASA.

The Justice Department declined USRA’s prosecution after considering the factors set forth in the Department’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations and the National Security Division Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations (NSD Enforcement Policy).

The NSD Enforcement Policy creates a presumption that companies that (1) voluntarily self-disclose to NSD potentially criminal violations arising out of or relating to the enforcement of export control or sanctions laws, (2) fully cooperate, and (3) timely and appropriately remediate will generally receive a non-prosecution agreement, unless aggravating factors are present.

In appropriate cases, the NSD Enforcement Policy authorizes prosecutors to go further, and exercise discretion to decline a company’s prosecution. This is the second time that NSD has exercised its discretion to decline the prosecution of a company under the NSD Enforcement Policy.